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Abstract
We analyse epistemic boolean games in a compu-
tationally grounded dynamic epistemic logic. The
agents’ knowledge is determined by what they see,
including higher-order visibility: agents may ob-
serve whether another agent observes an atom or
not. The agents’ actions consist in modifying the
truth values of atoms. We provide an axiomatisa-
tion of the logic, establish that the model checking
problem is in PSPACE, and show how one can rea-
son about equilibria in epistemic boolean games.
1 Introduction
Modeling knowledge and decision making are central in
multi-agent systems. A key issue is to provide models that
are natural and easy to build. Boolean games [Harrenstein et
al., 2001; Bonzon et al., 2006; Dunne et al., 2008] were de-
signed with that motivation. There, actions are determined by
the agents’ control of propositional variables. In that sense,
boolean games are easy to build. More recently, they were
extended with epistemic goals [A˚gotnes et al., 2013] where
knowledge is determined by the agents’ observation of propo-
sitional variables. Several approaches to reasoning about
knowledge building on such propositional observability exist
in the literature, e.g. [Lomuscio et al., 2000; Su et al., 2007;
van der Hoek et al., 2012; van Benthem et al., 2015]. There,
epistemic accessibility relations are built in a natural way:
agent i cannot distinguish w from w′ when all the variables
i sees have the same truth value at w and w′. A drawback
of these approaches is that who sees what is common knowl-
edge: for every variable p and agent i, if i sees p then it is
common knowledge that i knows whether p is true; if i does
not see p then i’s ignorance about p is common knowledge.
There exist only few attempts avoiding this. Some of them
suppose that observation comes from geometrical constraints:
an agent must physically see another agent in the space [Bal-
biani et al., 2013a; Gasquet et al., 2014]. A more recent at-
tempt is Dynamic Epistemic Logic of Propositional Assign-
ment and Observation DEL-PAO [Herzig et al., 2015]. It is
not grounded on geometrical constraints and thereby allows
more flexibility in the description of higher-order visibility.
Its language contains special higher-order visibility atoms:
the atom Sip expresses that i sees the value of p; SiSjp ex-
presses that i sees whether j sees p; and so on. It also contains
dynamic operators that are based on assignments of proposi-
tional variables. The resulting programs modify not only the
world, but also the agents’ knowledge.
We extend DEL-PAO by adding further special atoms:
control atoms. The atom Cip is true if agent i controls the
value of p; CiCjp is true if i controls whether agent j con-
trols p; etc. We allow nesting: CiSjp means that i controls
j’s visibility of the truth value of p; SiCjp that i sees whether
j controls p; and so on. A given set of visibility and control
atoms determines a Kripke structure in a natural way. This
allows to interpret epistemic operators Kiϕ (“i knows that
ϕ”) and strategic operators ✸Jϕ (“agents in J can change
values of variables they control while the other agents do not
act so that ϕ is true”). The latter is an operator of “ceteris
paribus strategic ability” in the sense of [van der Hoek and
Wooldridge, 2005; Herzig, 2015]. We claim that it is eas-
ier for a modeler to describe a situation with visibility and
control atoms instead of designing a Kripke structure from
scratch. We call our logic DEL-PAOC: Dynamic Epistemic
Logic of Propositional Assignment, Observation and Control.
In DEL-PAOC, epistemic and strategic operators can be re-
duced to programs, leading to a sound and complete axiom-
atization by reduction axioms. Our logic allows to capture
epistemic boolean games. While control in such games is
both exclusive and exhaustive—each atom is controlled by
exactly one agent—we do not impose this in our logic, but
can nevertheless reason about it.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 intro-
duce language and semantics. Sections 4 and 5 provide an ax-
iomatization and complexity results. Section 6 applies DEL-
PAOC to epistemic boolean games. Section 7 concludes.
2 Language
Let Prop be a countable non-empty set of propositional vari-
ables and let Agt be a finite non-empty set of agents. Atomic
formulas of our language are sequences of visibility and con-
trol operators followed by propositional variables.
The set of observability operators is
OBS = {Si : i ∈ Agt} ∪ {JS},
where Si stands for individual visibility of agent i and JS
stands for joint visibility of all agents. The set of control op-
erators is
CTRL = {Ci : i ∈ Agt},
where Ci stands for control of agent i. The set of all se-
quences of visibility and control operators is noted (OBS ∪
CTRL)∗ and the set of all non-empty sequences is noted
(OBS∪CTRL)+. We use σ ,σ ′, . . . for elements of (OBS∪
CTRL)∗. Finally, the set of atomic formulas is:
ATM = {σ p : σ ∈ (OBS ∪ CTRL)∗, p ∈ Prop}.
The language of programs and formulas of DEL-PAOC is
defined by the following grammar:
pi ::= +α | −α | (pi;pi) | (pi ⊔ pi) | ϕ?
ϕ ::= α | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Kiϕ | CKϕ | ✸Jϕ | [pi]ϕ
where α ranges over ATM , i over Agt and J over 2Agt .
Atomic programs are assignments to atoms: +α makes α true
and −α makes α false. Complex programs are constructed
with dynamic logic operators: pi;pi′ is sequential composi-
tion, pi⊔pi′ is nondeterministic choice, and ϕ? is test. [pi]ϕ
reads “after all executions of pi, ϕ holds”; Kiϕ and CKϕ
read “i knows that ϕ on the basis of what she observes” and
“all agents commonly know that ϕ on the basis of what they
jointly observe”; ✸Jϕ reads “agents in J can achieve ϕ by
modifying variables they control if other agents do not act”,
which is ceteris paribus strategic ability [van der Hoek and
Wooldridge, 2005; Herzig, 2015].
The length of formulas ϕ and programs pi, noted |ϕ| and
|pi|, is the number of symbols used to write them down, where
we do not count [, ], and parentheses and consider that JS ,
CK , agent names and propositional variables have length 1.
The set of atomic formulas of ATM occurring in the formula
ϕ is noted ATM (ϕ); the set ATM (pi) is defined similarly.
The other boolean operators⊤,⊥, ∨,→ and↔ are defined
as usual. Moreover, K̂iϕ abbreviates ¬Ki¬ϕ, ✷Jϕ abbre-
viates ¬✸J¬ϕ and 〈pi〉ϕ abbreviates ¬[pi]¬ϕ. The program
skip abbreviates ⊤? and fail abbreviates ⊥?.
3 Semantics
Our semantics are based on valuations, or worlds, that are
noted w, w′, u, v, etc. They are subsets of the set of atomic
formulas ATM . Then the (unique) model W = 2ATM con-
tains every possible valuation. As it is unique we keep it im-
plicit and only mention the current valuation w in the truth
conditions. We write w(α) = w′(α) when α has the same
value in w and w′, i.e., when either α ∈ w and α ∈ w′, or
α /∈ w and α /∈ w′.
3.1 Strategic Relations
The relation RJ is an accessibility relation for the ceteris
paribus strategic operator ✸J . It is defined as follows:
wRJw
′ iff Ciα /∈ w for all i ∈ J implies w(α) = w
′(α).
Intuitively, only atoms controlled by at least one agent in J
can be modified by the coalition J between w and w′.
3.2 Epistemic Relations and Introspection
We now define accessibility relations❀i and❀Agt allowing
to interpret the epistemic operators Ki and CK . These rela-
tions are determined by visibility information: two valuations
w and w′ are related by❀i if every α that i sees at w has the
same value, and similarly for❀Agt . More formally:
w ❀i w
′ iff Siα ∈ w implies w(α) = w
′(α)
w ❀Agt w
′ iff JSα ∈ w implies w(α) = w′(α)
The relations❀i and❀Agt are reflexive, but they are nei-
ther transitive nor symmetric.1 Transitivity and symmetry are
however standard requirements for a logic of knowledge. We
will see in the sequel how these constraints can be guaranteed
by means of appropriate introspection constraints.
A valuation w ∈ 2ATM is introspective if and only if the
following hold, for every α ∈ ATM and i ∈ Agt :
SiSiα ∈ w (C1)
JSJSα ∈ w (C2)
JSSiSiα ∈ w (C3)
if JSα ∈ w, then Siα ∈ w (C4)
if JSα ∈ w, then JSSiα ∈ w (C5)
The set of all introspective valuations is noted INTR.
Together, the last two constraints ensure that when JSα ∈
w then σ α ∈ w for σ ∈ OBS+. This motivates the following
relation of introspective consequence between atoms:
α ⇒ β iff either α = β,
or α = JSα′ and β = σ α′ for some σ ∈ OBS+.
Introspective valuations can be characterized as valuations
that are closed under introspective consequence.
An atom α ∈ ATM is valid in INTR if and only if α
belongs to every valuation in INTR. It is shown in [Herzig et
al., 2015] that α is valid in INTR iff α is of the form either
σ SiSiα with σ ∈ OBS
∗, or σ JSα with σ ∈ OBS+. It is
further shown there that the relation❀Agt and every relation
❀i are equivalence relations on INTR.
We do not have any relations between visibility and con-
trol. One might e.g. require that control implies visibility. We
will comment on that in the conclusion.
3.3 Truth Conditions and Validity
Given an introspective valuation w, our update operations add
or remove atoms. This requires some care: we want the re-
sulting valuation to be introspective. For example, remov-
ing SiSip should be impossible. Another example is when w
does not contain Sip: then w∪{JSp} would violate (C4). So
when adding an atom to w we also have to add all its positive
consequences. Symmetrically, when removing an atom we
also have to remove its negative consequences. Let us define
the following:
Eff +(α) = {β ∈ ATM : α⇒ β}
Eff −(α) = {β ∈ ATM : β ⇒ α}
Clearly, when w is introspective then both w ∪ Eff +(α) and
w \ Eff −(α) are so, too (unless α is valid in INTR).
Truth conditions are standard for boolean operators and:
w |= α iff α ∈ w
1For example, ∅ ❀i w for every w ⊆ ATM , while w ❀i ∅
fails to hold as soon as there is a p such that p and Sip are in w.
w |= Kiϕ iff ∀w
′ ∈ INTR such that w ❀i w
′, w′ |= ϕ
w |= CKϕ iff ∀w′ ∈ INTR such that w ❀Agt w
′, w′ |= ϕ
w |= ✸Jϕ iff ∃w
′ ∈ INTR such that wRJw
′ and w′ |= ϕ
w |= [pi]ϕ iff ∀w′ such that wRpiw
′, w′ |= ϕ
where Rpi is a binary relation on valuations that is defined as:
wR+αw
′ iff w′ = w ∪ Eff +(α)
wR−αw
′ iff w′ = w\Eff −(α) and α not valid in INTR
wRpi1;pi2w
′ iff there exists u such that wRpi1u and uRpi2w
′
wRpi1⊔pi2w
′ iff wRpi1w
′ or wRpi2w
′
wRϕ?w
′ iff w = w′ and w |= ϕ
Lemma 1 ([Herzig et al., 2015]). Let w ∈ INTR and
wRpiw
′. Then w′ ∈ INTR.
Truth conditions are defined on any valuation, including
non-introspective ones. However, the intended behavior of
the relations Rpi is not guaranteed in the latter case.
When w |= ϕ we say that w is a model of ϕ. The set of
(not necessarily introspective) models of ϕ is noted ‖ϕ‖.
We generalise validity in INTR from atoms to formu-
las: a formula ϕ is valid in INTR if INTR ⊆ ‖ϕ‖. It
is plainly valid if ‖ϕ‖ = 2ATM . Satisfiability in INTR
and plain satisfiability are defined analogously. For example,
Sip↔ (Kip ∨Ki¬p) is INTR-valid, but not plainly so.
We note that our epistemic operators behave differently
from the standard operators; for a discussion see [Herzig et
al., 2015; Charrier et al., 2016].
4 Axiomatics
We are going to reduce epistemic and strategic operators to
programs. We then show how to reduce dynamic operators.
4.1 Replacement of Equivalents
The rule of replacement of equivalents preserves validity
(both, plain and introspective). It allows us to apply the re-
duction axioms that we are going to introduce in the rest of
the section to the subformulas of a given formula.
Proposition 1. Let ϕ′ be obtained from ϕ by replacing some
occurrence of χ in ϕ by χ′. Let w be a valuation. If w |=
χ↔ χ′ then w |= ϕ↔ ϕ′.
4.2 Eliminating Epistemic Operators
The epistemic operators can be eliminated with the help of
the following programs:
varyIfNotSeen(i,α) = Siα? ⊔ (¬Siα?; (+α ⊔ −α))
varyIfNotSeen(i, A) = varyIfNotSeen(i,α1); · · · ;
varyIfNotSeen(i,αn)
where A = {α1, . . . ,αn} is a finite set of atoms that we sup-
pose ordered in some arbitrary way. The former program tests
whether α is seen by agent i; if this is the case then nothing
is done, otherwise the truth value of α is nondeterministically
set to either true or false. Similarly for the set of all agents:
varyIfNotSeen(Agt ,α) = JSα? ⊔ (¬JSα?; (+α ⊔ −α))
varyIfNotSeen(Agt , A) = varyIfNotSeen(Agt ,α1); · · · ;
varyIfNotSeen(Agt ,αn)
In both cases, the program is skip when the set A is empty.
Proposition 2. Let ϕ be without epistemic operators. The
following equivalences are valid in INTR:
Kiϕ↔ [varyIfNotSeen(i,ATM (ϕ))]ϕ
CKϕ↔ [varyIfNotSeen(Agt ,ATM (ϕ))]ϕ
Proof. The program varyIfNotSeen(i,ATM (ϕ)) is the syn-
tactic counterpart of the definition of ❀i, restricted to rele-
vant atomic variables ATM (ϕ). Lemma 1 ensures that we
do not leave the set of introspective valuations.
4.3 Eliminating Strategic Operators
Strategic operators ✸J are reduced to programs in a similar
way:
varyIfCtrl(J,α) =
((∨
i∈J
Ciα
)
?; (+α⊔ −α)
)
⊔ ¬
(∨
i∈J
Ciα
)
?
varyIfCtrl(J,A) = varyIfCtrl(J,α1); . . . ; varyIfCtrl(J,αn)
where A = {α1, . . . ,αn} is a finite set of atoms that we sup-
pose ordered such that k ≤ l implies that |αk| ≤ |αl|.
2
Again, the program is skip when A is empty.
Proposition 3. Let ϕ be without epistemic operators. The
following equivalence is valid in INTR:
✸Jϕ↔ 〈varyIfCtrl(J,ATM (ϕ))〉ϕ
Proof. The program varyIfCtrl(J,ATM (ϕ)) is the syn-
tactic counterpart—restricted to relevant atomic variables
ATM (ϕ)—of the relation RJ between valuations that is used
in order to interpret ✸Jϕ. Lemma 1 ensures that we do not
leave the set of introspective valuations.
For example, the formula
✸{i}(p ∨ q)↔ 〈varyIfCtrl({i}, {p, q})〉(p ∨ q)
is INTR-valid, where varyIfCtrl({i}, {p, q}) is the program(
(Cip?; (+p ⊔ −p)) ⊔ ¬Cip?
)
;(
(Ciq?; (+q ⊔ −q)) ⊔ ¬Ciq?
)
.
So epistemic and strategic operators can be removed, start-
ing from the innermost and using propositions 2 and 3. The
result is a formula containing only dynamic operators. The
next series of axioms will allow to reduce these.
4.4 Reduction Axioms for Programs
Reduction axioms for programs are standard; we only have to
deal with the special case of removing an INTR-valid atom.
2This is necessary: suppose CiCip is true, and both CiCip
and Cip are in A. Then when varyIfCtrl({i}, Cip) is executed, it
will modify Cip non-deterministically, thus being problematic when
testing it in varyIfCtrl({i}, p) afterwards.
Proposition 4. The following equivalences are plainly valid.
[pi;pi′]ϕ↔ [pi][pi′]ϕ (Red ;)
[pi ⊔ pi′]ϕ↔ [pi]ϕ ∧ [pi′]ϕ (Red⊔)
[ϕ?]ϕ′ ↔ ϕ→ ϕ′ (Red?)
[+α]¬ϕ↔ ¬[+α]ϕ (Red+α,¬)
[−α]¬ϕ↔
{
⊤ if α is valid in INTR
¬[−α]ϕ otherwise
(Red−α,¬)
[+α](ϕ∧ϕ′)↔ [+α]ϕ ∧ [+α]ϕ′ (Red+α,∧)
[−α](ϕ∧ϕ′)↔ [−α]ϕ ∧ [−α]ϕ′ (Red−α,∧)
[+α]β ↔
{
⊤ if α⇒ β
β otherwise
(Red+α)
[−α]β ↔

⊥ if α is not valid in INTR and β⇒α
⊤ if α is valid in INTR
β otherwise (Red−α)
4.5 Axiomatization
The axiomatization of DEL-PAOC is given by:
• the axioms of CPL (Classical Propositional Logic);
• the reduction axioms for epistemic, strategic, and dy-
namic operators of propositions 2, 3, and 4;
• the introspection axioms respectively
noted (VisC1)-(VisC5): SiSiα, JSJSα, JSSiSiα,
JSα→ Siα and JSα→ JSSiα;
• the rule of Modus Ponens and the rules of inference for
Ki, CK, and [pi]:
ϕ↔ ϕ′
Kiϕ↔ Kiϕ
′
ϕ↔ ϕ′
CKϕ↔ CKϕ′
ϕ↔ ϕ′
[pi]ϕ↔ [pi]ϕ′
Theorem 1. The axiomatization of DEL-PAOC is sound and
complete w.r.t. the set of introspective valuations.
Proof. The reduction axioms for epistemic, strategic, and dy-
namic operators allow to eliminate all modal operators. The
resulting formula is INTR-equivalent to the original formula.
It is INTR-valid if and only if it is a logical consequence in
classical propositional logic of the introspection axioms.
5 Complexity
We define the relevant atoms of a formula ϕ and a program pi
by structural induction as follows:
RATM (α) = {α}
RATM (Kiϕ) = RATM (ϕ) ∪ {Siα : α ∈ RATM (ϕ)}
RATM (CKϕ) = RATM (ϕ) ∪ {JSα : α ∈ RATM (ϕ)}
RATM (✸Jϕ) = RATM (ϕ) ∪ {Ciα : α ∈ RATM (ϕ)}
and homomorphic otherwise. We observe that the car-
dinality of RATM (ϕ) can be exponential in the length
of ϕ: for example, the cardinality of the set of atoms
RATM (Ki1 . . .Kinp) is in 2
n.
Given a set of atoms A, a valuation w is introspective w.r.t.
A if (i) if α is valid in INTR and α ∈ A then α ∈ w and
(ii) if α ∈ w and α′ ∈ Eff +(α) ∩A then α′ ∈ w.
Proposition 5. For every DEL-PAOC formula ϕ, w |= ϕ iff
w ∩ RATM (ϕ) |= ϕ.
The DEL-PAOC model checking problem is then defined
for valuations that are introspective w.r.t. the relevant atoms
of the formula under concern:
• input: a DEL-PAOC-formula ϕ and a finite valuation w
that is introspective w.r.t. RATM (ϕ);
• output: yes if w |= ϕ, no otherwise.
Theorem 2. The DEL-PAOC model checking problem is
PSPACE-complete.
Proof. For the upper bound, we give a reduction in polyno-
mial time from the DEL-PAOC-model checking problem to
the model checking problem of Dynamic Logic of Proposi-
tional Assignments DL-PA [Herzig et al., 2011; Balbiani et
al., 2013b; 2014]. The reduction transforms a instance (w,ϕ)
of our model checking problem into a instance (w, tr(ϕ)) of
the DL-PA model checking problem. The translation tr is
defined as follows: a DEL-PAOC-formula ϕ is transformed
into a DL-PA-formula tr(ϕ), that is, a DEL-PAOC-formula
that does not contain any occurrence of Ki, CK and✸J oper-
ators. We replace in ϕ any innermost subformula of the form
Kiψ, CKψ and ✸Jψ by, respectively,
[varyIfNotSeen(i,ATM (ψ))]ψ,
[varyIfNotSeen(Agt ,ATM (ψ))]ψ,
〈varyIfCtrl(J,ATM (ψ))〉ψ.
We keep replacing until the resulting formula tr(ϕ) does not
contain any occurrence of Ki, CK and ✸J operators. By
propositions 2 and 3, tr(ϕ) is equivalent to ϕ.
We define the size of 〈w,ϕ〉 as the cardinality of w plus the
length of ϕ. Note that the size of tr(ϕ) is exponential in the
size of ϕ but is polynomial in the size of the input 〈w,ϕ〉; ac-
tually the reduction can be implemented in polynomial time.
As the model checking problem of DL-PA is in PSPACE [Bal-
biani et al., 2014], the DEL-PAOC-model checking problem
is in PSPACE, too.
For the lower bound, it suffices to observe that the model
checking for DEL-PAO can be trivially reduced to the model
checking for DEL-PAOC.
6 Epistemic Boolean Games
We first recall boolean games and epistemic boolean games.
We then show how to express in DEL-PAOC that a given val-
uation is a Nash equilibrium and whether a Nash equilibrium
exists.
6.1 Background
Boolean games [Harrenstein et al., 2001; Bonzon et al., 2006;
Dunne et al., 2008] are games in which each player wants to
achieve a certain goal that is represented by a propositional
formula. They correspond to the specific subclass of normal-
form games in which agents have binary preferences (i.e.,
payoffs are either 0 or 1) and are widely accepted as a useful
and natural abstraction for reasoning about social interaction
in multi-agent systems.
A boolean game is a tuple (Agt ,Propf , (Ψi)i∈Agt ,
(γi)i∈Agt) where Prop
f is a finite subset of Prop, each
Ψi ⊆ Prop
f is the set of variables agent i controls, and γi is a
formula of the propositional language such that ATM (γi) ⊆
Propf . The latter expresses i’s personal goal, i.e., the state
of affairs i wants to achieve. Exclusive and exhaustive con-
trol is assumed: the sets Ψi partition the set of variables
Propf . So the two conditions (i) Ψi ∩ Ψj = ∅ if i 5= j
and (ii)
⋃
i∈Agt Ψi = Prop
f are both satisfied.
A strategy for an agent i, noted si, is an interpretation of
variables controlled by i, that is to say, si ⊆ Ψi. The set
of all possible strategies of agent i is denoted by Σi. Given
a strategy si for each member of a coalition J , the induced
strategy for J is sJ =
⋃
i∈J si. A strategy sAgt for Agt is
called a strategy profile. It can be seen as an interpretation of
the set of variables Propf .
Agent i’s utility function maps every strategy profile to i’s
reward, depending on on the truth value of i’s goal in sAgt :
Ui(sAgt) =
{
1 if sAgt |= γi;
0 otherwise.
We can express solution concepts such as Nash equilib-
rium in a boolean game in our logic. Let 〈si, sAgt\{i}〉 be the
strategy profile composed of the strategy si of i and of the
strategy sAgt\{i} of i’s opponents. We say that si is a best
response to sAgt\{i} if and only if, for every strategy s
′
i ∈ Σi,
Ui(〈s
′
i, sAgt\{i}〉) ≤ Ui(〈si, sAgt\{i}〉) holds. That is, ev-
ery other strategy of i against the same strategy of opponents
would not increase i’s reward.
A strategy profile sAgt is a Nash equilibrium, if and only
if, for every i ∈ Agt , si is a best response to sAgt\{i}. This
means every agent cannot get a bigger reward by choosing
another strategy if the others do not change theirs.
6.2 Epistemic Boolean Games in DEL-PAOC
An interesting aspect of our logic DEL-PAOC is that it al-
lows us to generalise boolean games to epistemic goals, in
the sense of being goals about (own and other agents’) knowl-
edge. Agents’ goals may now be epistemic formulas: DEL-
PAOC formulas that are built from the propositional variables
by the epistemic operators Ki and CK . For example, we can
represent the fact that i wants j to know that p is true if and
only if agent z knows that p is true by: γi = Kjp ↔ Kzp.
Another example is i’s goal that the agents have common
knowledge that p, formally: γi = CKp.
We define ATMOBS to be the subset of ATM which only
contains propositional variables and atoms about observabil-
ity of other atoms, that is, atoms beginning with a Si:
ATMOBS = Prop ∪ {Siσp ∈ ATM : i∈Agt ,σ ∈OBS
∗}.
An epistemic boolean game is a tuple B = (Agt ,
ATM
f
OBS , (Ψi)i∈Agt , (γi)i∈Agt) where ATM
f
OBS is a finite
subset of ATMOBS , the sets (Ψi)i∈Agt partition ATM
f
OBS ,
and every γi is an epistemic formula such that ATM (γi) ⊆
ATM
f
OBS . Strategies of players and coalitions, utilities over
strategy profiles, as well as the concept of best response and
Nash equilibrium are defined exactly as in the context of stan-
dard boolean games.
6.3 Nash Equilibrium in DEL-PAOC
The Nash equilibria of a given epistemic boolean game can
be characterised in the language of DEL-PAOC.
Proposition 6. Let B = (Agt ,ATM fOBS , (Ψi)i∈Agt ,
(γi)i∈Agt) be an epistemic boolean game and let
Nash =
∧
i∈Agt
(✸{i}γi → γi).
Then sAgt is a Nash equilibrium for B if and only if
sAgt ∪ {Ciα : i ∈ Agt ,α ∈ Ψi} |= Nash.
The following proposition provides a characterization in
the logic DEL-PAOC of the existence of a Nash equilibrium
in a certain epistemic boolean game.
Proposition 7. Let B = (Agt ,ATM fOBS , (Ψi)i∈Agt ,
(γi)i∈Agt) be an epistemic boolean game. Then B has at least
one Nash equilibrium if and only if
{Ciα : i ∈ Agt ,α ∈ Ψi} |= ✸AgtNash.
The preceding two propositions together with Theorem 2
about complexity of model checking for DEL-PAOC pro-
vide a complexity result both for membership problem and
for existence problem of Nash equilibria in epistemic boolean
games, respectively the problem of checking whether a cer-
tain strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium of a given epistemic
boolean game and the problem of checking whether a given
epistemic boolean game has at least one Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3. Membership problem and existence problem
of Nash equilibria in epistemic boolean games are both in
PSPACE.
Proof. From propositions 6 and 7, both problems polynomi-
ally reduce to the DEL-PAOC model checking problem.
Let us illustrate epistemic boolean games with an example
of coordination game. We note that it cannot be expressed in
the framework of [A˚gotnes et al., 2013].
Example 1. Suppose we have two agents 1 and 2 each of
which knows a bit, respectively noted b1 and b2, that the
other agent does not know. Both 1 and 2 have the same
goal: K1b2 ↔ K2b1, that is, 1 wants 2 to know her se-
cret only if 1 knows the secret of 2, and similarly for 2.
Each agent can either talk or keep quiet; in other words,
each agent has control of the other agent’s visibility of her
bit. The corresponding epistemic boolean game is Bb =
(Agt ,ATM fOBS , (Ψi)i∈Agt , (γi)i∈Agt) where Agt = {1, 2},
ATM
f
OBS = {b1, b2, S2b1, S1b2}, Ψ1 = {b1, S2b1}, Ψ2 =
{b2, S1b2} and γ1 = γ2 = K1b2 ↔ K2b1.
Two interesting Nash equilibria are the following. Either
they both share their secrets: sAgt = {b1, b2, S2b1, S1b2};
or they both remain silent: sAgt = {b1, b2}.
Indeed, we can show that
{b1, b2, S2b1, S1b2, C1b1, C2b2, C1S2b1, C2S1b2} |=
(✸{1}γ1 → γ1) ∧ (✸{2}γ2 → γ2)
and {b1, b2, C1b1, C2b2, C1S2b1, C2S1b2} |=
(✸{1}γ1 → γ1) ∧ (✸{2}γ2 → γ2).
Intuitively, each agent can only modify the other agent’s
visibility of her secret; if only one of them changes her strat-
egy then it will break the equivalence of the goal.
6.4 Capturing Exclusive and Exhaustive Control
in DEL-PAOC
Our logic DEL-PAOC does not impose that control is exclu-
sive. However, the valuations in propositions 6 and 7 where
we check whether Nash is true have exclusive and exhaus-
tive control. In this section, we investigate how exclusive and
exhaustive control can be built into DEL-PAOC.
First, the set of valuations with exclusive and exhaustive
control is:
EX = {w ∈ 2ATM : for every α ∈ ATM ,
there is an i ∈ Agt such that Ciα ∈ w
and for all j ∈ Agt \ {i}, Cjα /∈ w}.
The set EX is therefore the set of valuations where
ΦEX (α) =
( ∧
i,j∈Agt,j '=i
¬(Ciα ∧ Cjα)
)
∧
( ∨
i∈Agt
Ciα
)
is true for every α ∈ ATM .
Just as for introspective valuations, we would like to stay
in valuations with exclusive control when executing our pro-
grams. Direct addition or removal of atoms of the form Ciα
may lead to worlds outside of EX . We therefore require that
control changing programs take the form
i
α
❀ j = Ciα?;−Ciα; +Cjα,
reading “i passes the control of α to j”.
Lemma 2. Let pi be a program built from nondeterministic
choice, sequences, tests and programs of the form i
α
❀ j. Let
w ∈ EX and wRpiw
′. Then w′ ∈ EX .
Proof. When i
α
❀ j is executed, α becomes controlled by j
only and control of the other atoms remains unchanged.
In epistemic boolean games, exclusive and exhaustive con-
trol should not only be preserved by the execution of pro-
grams, it should also be common knowledge. We can tune
DEL-PAOC to make it common knowledge that control is
exclusive and exhaustive. We modify the semantics of DEL-
PAOC so that we restrict to valuations in EX :
w |= Kiϕ iff ∀w
′∈INTR∩EX s.th. w ❀i w
′, w′ |= ϕ
w |= CKϕ iff ∀w′∈INTR∩EX s.th. w ❀Agt w
′, w′ |= ϕ
We then have to add a test to the programs of Section 4.2
reducing the epistemic operators.
Proposition 8. Let ΦEX (ϕ) =
∧
α∈RATM (ϕ) ΦEX (α). Then
for every w ∈ INTR ∩ EX :
w |= CK ΦEX (α) , for every atom α;
w |= Kiϕ↔ [varyIfNotSeen(i,ATM (ϕ));ΦEX (ϕ)?]ϕ;
w |= CKϕ↔ [varyIfNotSeen(Agt ,ATM (ϕ));ΦEX (ϕ)?]ϕ.
Proof. The test ΦEX (ϕ)? ensures we stay in EX .
Moreover, under the new truth conditions all the S5 ax-
ioms are valid in INTR ∩ EX . In contrast, plain validity
fails for formulas such as the instance of the truth axiom
KiΦEX (α)→ ΦEX (α).
6.5 Discussion
In [A˚gotnes et al., 2013], an alternative concept of epistemic
boolean game is introduced and both membership and exis-
tence problems for Nash equilibrium in this class of games
are studied. However, there is a major difference with our
epistemic boolean games: in our class of epistemic boolean
games, agents can (i) affect the truth value of propositional
variables, and (ii) modify the visibility conditions of propo-
sitional variables, including higher-order visibility. For in-
stance, an agent can play a strategy to ensure that another
agent can see the truth value of a given propositional vari-
able p or to ensure that another agent can see whether an-
other agent can see the truth value of p, and so on. In
A˚gotnes et al.’s class, agents can only affect the truth value
of propositional variables and, indirectly, the knowledge of
those agents’ who can see the truth value of these variables;
but agents cannot modify the visibility conditions of propo-
sitional variables. In other words, in A˚gotnes et al.’s class of
epistemic boolean games visibility conditions remain static,
whereas in our class they can change. From this perspec-
tive, their class of epistemic boolean games can be seen as
the subclass of ours where the condition ATM
f
OBS ⊆ Prop
holds (i.e., agents can only control propositional variables but
cannot control visibility of propositional variables).
A˚gotnes et al. show that for their class of epistemic boolean
games, membership and existence of Nash equilibria are
PSPACE-complete. In Section 6.3, we have given a com-
plexity result for a more general class of epistemic boolean
games.
7 Conclusion
We have studied a dynamic epistemic logic of visibility and
control in which one can deduce strategic abilities of coali-
tions of agents. It accounts for concepts from boolean games
such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium that can be ex-
tended to epistemic boolean games in a straightforward way.
While the complexity of DEL-PAOC satisfiability is open,
we have proved that model checking is in PSPACE, which in-
volves reducing the infinite models to finite models involving
only the relevant atoms. It follows that the membership prob-
lem and existence problem of a Nash equilibria in epistemic
boolean games are both in PSPACE. It remains to establish
the lower bound.
We claim that our framework can be used in practice eas-
ily since visibility information and control information corre-
sponds to what an agents obtain from their sensors.
An interesting variant involving interaction between
knowledge and strategies is the requirement ‘control implies
visibility’. One way of guaranteeing this is to change the con-
dition Siα? in the program varyIfNotSeen(i,α) = Siα? ⊔
(¬Siα?; (+α⊔−α)) of Proposition 2 by (Ciα∧Siα)?; other
constraints can be implemented similarly. A more principled
way is to further restrict the set of introspective valuations
by imposing constraints such as SiCiα, for every i and α.
However, the difficulty here is to redefine INTR such that
Lemma 1 still holds. In future work we plan to extend our
analysis to iterated boolean games and more generally to re-
peated interaction.
Acknowledgements. Thanks are due to the IJCAI reviewers
for their thorough reading and useful comments.
References
[A˚gotnes et al., 2013] Thomas A˚gotnes, Paul Harrenstein,
Wiebe van der Hoek, and Michael Wooldridge. Boolean
games with epistemic goals. In Logic, Rationality, and
Interaction - 4th International Workshop, LORI 2013,
Hangzhou, China, October 9-12, 2013, Proceedings,
pages 1–14, 2013.
[Balbiani et al., 2013a] Philippe Balbiani, Olivier Gasquet,
and Franc¸ois Schwarzentruber. Agents that look at one
another. Logic Journal of the IGPL, 21(3):438–467, 2013.
[Balbiani et al., 2013b] Philippe Balbiani, Andreas Herzig,
and Nicolas Troquard. Dynamic logic of proposi-
tional assignments: a well-behaved variant of PDL. In
Orna Kupferman, editor, Proceedings of the 28th Annual
IEEE/ACM Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
(LICS), pages 143–152, 2013.
[Balbiani et al., 2014] Philippe Balbiani, Andreas Herzig,
Franc¸ois Schwarzentruber, and Nicolas Troquard. DL-PA
and DCL-PC: model checking and satisfiability problem
are indeed in PSPACE. CoRR, abs/1411.7825, 2014.
[Bonzon et al., 2006] Elise Bonzon, Marie-Christine
Lagasquie-Schiex, Je´roˆme Lang, and Bruno Zanuttini.
Boolean games revisited. In Gerhard Brewka, Silvia
Coradeschi, Anna Perini, and Paolo Traverso, editors,
Proceedings of the 17th European Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, pages 265–269, 2006.
[Charrier et al., 2016] Tristan Charrier, Andreas Herzig,
Emiliano Lorini, Faustine Maffre, and Franc¸ois
Schwarzentruber. Building epistemic logic from ob-
servations and public announcements. In Proceedings
of the 15th International Conference on Principles of
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR), 2016.
[Dunne et al., 2008] Paul E. Dunne, Wiebe van der Hoek,
Sarit Kraus, and Michael Wooldridge. Cooperative
boolean games. In Proceedings of the 7th International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Sys-
tems (AAMAS), pages 1015–1022. International Founda-
tion for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
2008.
[Gasquet et al., 2014] Olivier Gasquet, Valentin Goranko,
and Franc¸ois Schwarzentruber. Big brother logic: logi-
cal modeling and reasoning about agents equipped with
surveillance cameras in the plane. In International con-
ference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems,
AAMAS ’14, Paris, France, May 5-9, 2014, pages 325–
332, 2014.
[Harrenstein et al., 2001] Paul Harrenstein, Wiebe van der
Hoek, John-Jules Meyer, and Cees Witteveen. Boolean
games. In Proceedings of the 8th Conference on Theoret-
ical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), pages
287–298. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., 2001.
[Herzig et al., 2011] Andreas Herzig, Emiliano Lorini,
Nicolas Troquard, and Fre´de´ric Moisan. A dynamic
logic of normative systems. In Proceedings of the 22nd
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(IJCAI), pages 228–233, 2011.
[Herzig et al., 2015] Andreas Herzig, Emiliano Lorini, and
Faustine Maffre. A poor man’s epistemic logic based on
propositional assignment and higher-order observation. In
Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Logic,
Rationality, and Interaction (LORI). Springer Berlin Hei-
delberg, 2015.
[Herzig, 2015] Andreas Herzig. Logics of knowledge and
action: critical analysis and challenges. Autonomous
Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 29(5):719–753, 2015.
[Lomuscio et al., 2000] Alessio Lomuscio, Ron van der
Meyden, and Mark Ryan. Knowledge in multiagent sys-
tems: initial configurations and broadcast. ACM Trans.
Comput. Log., 1(2):247–284, 2000.
[Su et al., 2007] Kaile Su, Abdul Sattar, and Xiangyu Luo.
Model checking temporal logics of knowledge via OB-
DDs. Comput. J., 50(4):403–420, 2007.
[van Benthem et al., 2015] Johan van Benthem, Jan van Ei-
jck, Malvin Gattinger, and Kaile Su. Symbolic model
checking for dynamic epistemic logic. In Wiebe van der
Hoek, Wesley H. Holliday, and Wen-Fang Wang, edi-
tors, Logic, Rationality, and Interaction - 5th Interna-
tional Workshop, LORI 2015 Taipei, Taiwan, October 28-
31, 2015, Proceedings, volume 9394 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 366–378. Springer, 2015.
[van der Hoek and Wooldridge, 2005] Wiebe van der Hoek
and Michael Wooldridge. On the logic of cooperation and
propositional control. Artificial Intelligence, 164(1-2):81–
119, May 2005.
[van der Hoek et al., 2012] Wiebe van der Hoek, Petar Iliev,
and Michael Wooldridge. A logic of revelation and con-
cealment. In Wiebe van der Hoek, Lin Padgham, Vin-
cent Conitzer, and Michael Winikoff, editors, Proceed-
ings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1115–
1122. IFAAMAS, 2012.
